Publications
[22] Eight Arguments for First-Person Realism - Philosophy Compass (forthcoming) - I give eight arguments in favor of the view that my first-person perspective on the world is metaphysically privileged.
[21] Center Indifference and Skepticism - Noûs (forthcoming) - I defend a version of The Principle of Indifference that is sensitive to one’s prior metaphysical beliefs, and by appealing to such a principle, I argue that Eternalism threatens to lead to external world skepticism, and Modal Realism threatens to lead to inductive skepticism.
[20] How to Ground Powers - Analysis (forthcoming) - I develop different versions of the grounding theory of powers under different assumptions about the metaphysics of properties, and I argue that the grounding theory of powers should not be developed within a Platonic framework of abstract universals.
[19] Modal Idealism - Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Mind (forthcoming) - I argue that that it is necessary that (i) every fundamental entity is conscious and (ii) every fundamental property is a phenomenal property.
[18] Experience and Time: A Metaphysical Approach - Analytic Philosophy (forthcoming) - We argue against the view that our most basic conscious experiences are temporally extended. Along the way, we aim to illustrate how debates about the temporal structure of experience are interconnected with a wide variety of other metaphysical debates, concerning the nature of consciousness, time, and the laws of nature (with Michele Odisseas Impagnatiello).
*Winner of the Sanders Prize in Philosophy of Mind.
[17] An Empirical Argument for Presentism - Oxford Studies in Metaphysics (forthcoming) - We argue that, contrary to orthodoxy, our best physical theories support Presentism over Eternalism (with Michele Odisseas Impagnatiello).
*Winner of the Sanders Prize in Metaphysics.
[16] Why Aren't I Part of a Whale? - Analysis (2023) - We present and assess an argument to the conclusion that how confident you should be in certain popular metaphysical views - concerning consciousness, mereology, and personal identity - sensitively depends on how massive you happen to be (with Caspar Hare).
[15] A Humean Non-Humeanism - Philosophical Studies (2023) - I defend a a synthesis of Humeanism and Non-Humeanism about natural necessity. The view has the explanatory benefits of Non-Humeanism while according with two central Humean principles: (i) all causal/nomic facts reduce to categorical/qualitative facts, and (ii) there are no necessary connections between wholly distinct existences.
[14] Lawful Persistence - Philosophical Perspectives (2022) - We argue that the laws of nature should govern both the qualitative and non-qualitative aspects of reality, and we assess how different views in the metaphysics of persistence might secure this stronger conception of the laws of nature. We conclude that (i) Perdurantists should be Qualitativists, (ii) Endurantists should be Non-Humean Monists, and (ii) Non-Qualitativists should believe in absolute simultaneity. (with Trevor Teitel).
[13] In Defense of Countabilism - Philosophical Studies (2022) - We defend the claim that, necessarily, every infinite collection (set or plurality) is countable. We also draw out some of the mathematical, physical, and metaphysical consequences of this claim (with Jessica Wilson).
[12] Ontology and Arbitrariness - Australasian Journal of Philosophy (2022) - I argue for a minimal ontology over a maximal ontology on the basis of arbitrariness arguments. Along the way, I argue for the non-existence of various kinds of abstract objects, and I also argue against material plenitude and modal realism.
[11] Dilating and Contracting Arbitrarily - Noûs (2022) - We argue that there are accuracy-based reasons that forbid moving from a precise credence to an imprecise credence arbitrarily, but there are no accuracy-based reasons that forbid moving from an imprecise credence to a precise credence arbitrarily (with Miriam Schoenfield and Sophie Horowitz).
[10] The Ineffability of Induction - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (2022) - I argue that induction cannot be justified given orthodox views about what is metaphysically possible, and I sketch an unorthodox “Non-Humean” view that avoids this argument.
[9] Look at the Time! - Analysis (2022) - I argue that we can get evidence for the temporal ontology of the universe simply by looking at the time.
[8] Why Can't There Be Numbers? - The Philosophical Quarterly (2022) - I develop and defend an argument that seeks to explain why it is necessary that there are no abstract mathematical objects.
[7] The World Just Is The Way It Is - The Monist (2021) - I develop a Monist view of objects, properties, and ontological categories. The resulting view implies that the world is purely qualitative, and it avoids many of the main problems with the substratum theory and the bundle theory.
[6] Derivatives and Consciousness - Journal of Consciousness Studies (2020) - I argue that a popular view in the philosophy of physics regarding rates of change is incompatible with a popular view in the philosophy of mind regarding phenomenal properties. I then sketch a panpsychist view that accounts for this tension in a unified way.
[5] A Puzzle About Rates of Change - Philosophical Studies (2020) - We develop a problem for reductionist theories of rates of change and evaluate various possible replies (with Trevor Teitel).
[4] Time-Slice Rationality and Self-Locating Belief - Philosophical Studies (2020) - I argue that those who accept Time-Slice Rationality should also accept the 'Relevance-Limiting Thesis', according to which essentially indexical facts are always evidentially irrelevant to non-indexical facts.
[3] A Paradox of Evidential Equivalence - Mind (2020) - I present a pair of cases which seem to suggest that we should treat evidence as a hyperintensional notion. I then explore some of the costs and benefits of such a view.
[2] Pluralism and the Problem of Purity - Analysis (2019) - I first argue that a recent argument by Trenton Merricks against Ontological Pluralism is unsound. I then go on to present a new dilemma against Ontological Pluralism that builds on Merricks' original dilemma.
[1] Self-Locating Evidence and the Metaphysics of Time - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (2019) - I argue that Presentism and Eternalism, in both classical and relativistic settings, make different observational predictions using self-locating evidence.
Work in Progress
[A Paper on Why There Is Something Rather Than Nothing]
[A Paper on The Principle of Sufficient Reason]
[Another Paper on the Principle of Sufficient Reason]
[A Paper on Determinism]
[A Paper on Primitive Laws]
[A Paper on Presentism]
[A Paper on Self-Locating Belief]